Firm Survival and Industry Evolution in Vertically Related Populations by de Figueiredo, John M. & Silverman, Brian S.
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Vol. 58, No. 9, September 2012, pp. 1632–1650
ISSN 0025-1909 (print)  ISSN 1526-5501 (online) http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1507
© 2012 INFORMS
Firm Survival and Industry Evolution in
Vertically Related Populations
John M. de Figueiredo
School of Law and Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708,
jdefig@duke.edu
Brian S. Silverman
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6, Canada,
silverman@rotman.utoronto.ca
This paper examines how the density and governance of vertically related populations affect the life chancesof organizations. We integrate the literatures on organizational ecology and vertical integration to develop
a theory of how (1) specialized upstream industries affect downstream survival rates, (2) the prevalence of
different governance forms among upstream and downstream organizations moderates this relationship, and
(3) different forms of governance exert differential competitive pressures on focal organizations. We find evi-
dence supporting our hypotheses in an empirical examination of the downstream laser printer industry and
upstream laser engine industry.
Key words : organizational ecology; strategy; vertical integration; computer-electronic industries
History : Received September 14, 2010; accepted November 18, 2011, by Jesper Sørensen, organizations.
Published online in Articles in Advance April 6, 2012.
Introduction
A strong empirical regularity found across industries
is the nonmonotonicity of firm density over time.
In economics, sociology, strategy, and organizational
behavior, researchers have documented in hundreds
of studies that the number of firms in an industry
increases from the birth of the industry to a peak and
then declines to some roughly steady-state number.
Sociologists, led by organizational ecologists, have
attributed this trend to legitimation of organiza-
tional fields and subsequent competition (Hannan and
Freeman 1989, Hannan et al. 2007). Economists have
attributed this inverted-U-shaped pattern to differ-
ences in cost structures of firms, driven mainly by
random differences in production efficiency or the dis-
covery/adoption of innovations (Jovanovic 1982,
Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994, Klepper 1996).
Although the theoretical mechanisms for explain-
ing this empirical regularity differ substantially across
sociological and economic approaches, both approa-
ches have typically evaluated organizational dynamics
within the context of a single, largely homogeneous
population or industry. This focus on a single popula-
tion allows for precise theoretical predictions and lean
empirical testing of the theoretical models. Neverthe-
less, this focus comes at a cost: it limits our insight
into the mechanisms by which one population may
affect another (Astley 1985). Some scholars have
addressed this concern by exploring interrelations
across populations that experience “niche overlap”—
that is, populations that compete only partially for
resources (Baum and Singh 1994, Dobrev and Kim
2006). Others have investigated how populations pur-
suing competing production technologies in the same
industry will affect each other’s life chances (Barnett
and Carroll 1987, Barnett 1990). Still others have
launched a study of “community ecology” in which
interdependent populations within a community of
populations influence each others’ evolution (Astley
1985, Lomi 1995, Ruef 2000). Yet thus far, the empiri-
cal efforts to flesh out the relationships between pop-
ulations have focused almost entirely on horizontally
related populations.
A nascent literature has begun to explore interac-
tions between vertically related industries. Bonaccorsi
and Giuri (2001) consider coevolution across vertically
related industries, arguing that evolutionary dynamics
of one industry are affected by dynamics of the other.
Negro and Sorenson (2006) consider the effect of verti-
cal integration on the competitive intensity generated
by rivals. In this study we extend this literature
by explicitly considering a broad set of connections
between vertically related industries. We believe that
this is a particularly fruitful area of study because
it enables us to draw on the voluminous literature
on vertical integration and vertical governance (e.g.,
Williamson 1985, Perry 1989). Specifically, we explore
whether a downstream firm’s exit rate is affected
by the prevalence of upstream suppliers of a key
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component. In particular, we explore whether the den-
sities of different governance forms in the upstream
supplier industry—vertically integrated (VI) suppliers
versus suppliers that sell on the open market—have
differential effects on the life chances of downstream
firms. We also explore whether different governance
forms among downstream rivals affect a downstream
firm’s exit rate differently.
After developing predictions pertaining to the
above relationships, we test them empirically in a
study of the desktop laser printer industry from 1984
to 1996. Hewlett-Packard pioneered this industry in
1984, introducing a printer that relied on a laser printer
engine produced by Canon. Both industries experi-
enced rapid growth in number of firms until 1991; the
printer industry then experienced a gradual decline in
population through the end of our sample, whereas
the engine industry has retained a stable number of
firms since 1992. These industries are characterized by
a variety of governance forms: fully integrated firms,
partially integrated firms (tapered integration), and
nonintegrated firms. We begin the empirical exercise
by replicating the results commonly found in organi-
zational ecology studies. Then, we bring our data to
examine the theoretical predictions in the model pre-
sented. In particular, we extend the literature on orga-
nizational ecology to include the full populations of
both upstream and downstream organizations from
the birth of both industries in two related industries.
We find that the density of the upstream engine pop-
ulation affects survival rates for downstream printer
firms in a nuanced way. Overall, the exit rate of printer
firms declines with increases in the density of engine
firms. But this effect is driven most heavily by den-
sity of nonintegrated engine firms; increases in den-
sity of vertically integrated firms (who “sell” some
or all of their engine output in-house to a down-
stream printer division) have significantly less effect
on printer firm exit rates. Focusing on downstream
rivalry, we find that fully integrated laser printer firms
exert substantially more competition on their down-
stream rivals than do nonintegrated firms, even after
controlling for the density of arms-length upstream
suppliers. Consistent with Negro and Sorenson (2006),
we also find evidence of “asymmetries” in the above
relationships. Integrated rivals generate more intense
competitive pressure on nonintegrated firms than on
other integrated firms, but experience less reciprocal
pressure from nonintegrated rivals than from inte-
grated rivals. And whereas the relationship between
engine firm density and printer firm survival holds
for nonintegrated printer firms, printer firms with in-
house engine production are unaffected by engine
firm density. In sum, we find that vertical populations
are interdependent, and that these interdependencies
vary with the nature and degree of vertical integration
across them.
Theory: Vertical Relationships and
Firm Survival Rates
How does the density of firms in a focal industry
affect the life chances of a constituent firm? Sociolo-
gists have developed an ecological theory to explain
the carrying capacity of an industry or population
(Hannan and Freeman 1989; Hannan and Carroll 1992;
Carroll and Hannan 1995, 2000). When new indus-
tries are born, organizational forms are not well under-
stood, and consequently the purveyors of such forms
face difficulties in overcoming the reluctance of key
resource providers to transact with them. For exam-
ple, the first automobile producers had to convince
prospective suppliers, employees, buyers, financiers,
and others that the automobile would be a viable
product—that it actually served a useful purpose, it
satisfied customer needs in a way that adds value,
and it could generate a profit for manufacturers. In
such an environmental context, firms find it difficult
and costly to operate. When there are only a handful
of such organizations, each organization is likely to
be dismissed as lacking legitimacy. But as such orga-
nizations become more prevalent, the organizational
form becomes more widely accepted as legitimate or
taken for granted, and each organization in the pop-
ulation faces fewer difficulties in accessing resources.
The downward-sloping portion of the U-shaped rela-
tionship between density and exit rates is attributable
to these legitimating effects of density. However, fur-
ther increases in density yield diminishing returns in
terms of legitimacy, and eventually the competitive
effects of density swamp legitimation effects. Com-
petitive effects arise as an increasing number of firms
compete for the finite pool of resources available.
The theory generates an organization failure rate
equation that can be described through a hazard rate
equation as follows:
4t5∝ exp41nit +2n2it51 (1)
where 4t5 is the hazard rate of a focal firm fail-
ing at time t, nit is the density of organizations in
population i at time t, and 1 and 2 are parameter
coefficients (Carroll and Hannan 1989). Equation (1)
indicates that the hazard rate is proportional to the
exponential function raised to organizational density
and density squared. In the traditional formulation of
the organizational ecology model, 1 < 0 and 2 > 0.
This results in a U-shaped curve of exit rates in time
or, in the full formulation of the model, an inverted
U-shaped density curve.
The basic model has been extended in many ways
since its original formulation. Hannan et al. (1995)
make a compelling argument that a multilevel model
is, in many cases, a more appropriate formulation
of density dependence and organizational evolution.
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Using data on the European automobile industry, they
argue that events across all of Europe affected legit-
imation of the automobile firms in a single country.
However, because of political and trade barriers, com-
petition was localized in each focal country. The the-
ory generated from such a multilevel model argues
t4t5∝ exp41Nt +2n2it51 (2)
where Nt is the density of organizations in all of the
related horizontal populations that convey legitima-
tion to the organizational form (in the Hannan et al.
1995 example, the number of automobile firms in all
of Europe), and nit is the density of organizations in
population i in the focal country (such as France). This
model also predicts 1 < 0 and 2 > 0.
The insight of this multilevel analysis has led
to many variants on the theme of interdependence
within and among populations, most focused on the
niches within an organizational field. For example, the
degree of overlap among niches in terms of needed
resources has been shown to affect the degree of com-
petition and mutualism exhibited across these niches
(e.g., Baum and Singh 1994). More generally, the rela-
tionship between market segments or niches in terms
of identity formation as well as resource demands
affects the evolution of organizational populations
(Dobrev and Kim 2006, Dobrev et al. 2006).1
Alternatively, the study of community ecology—
wherein scholars study a “group of populations
bound by ecological ties 0 0 0 that consequently coe-
volve with each other” (Rao 2002, p. 541)—is another
major stream of thinking on this issue. Studies of the
interaction between rural banks and urban banks in
Italy (Lomi 1995), between telephone companies rely-
ing on common-battery technology and those relying
on magneto technology (Barnett 1990), or among
different organizational forms within the healthcare
industry (Ruef 2000) demonstrate mutualistic and
competitive effects across niches. In this literature,
as in the work of Hannan et al. (1995) and Bigelow
et al. (1997), multilevel modeling of the founding and
failure process allows researchers to understand how
interdependent subpopulations affect each other. Gen-
erally, though, these studies have focused on interac
tions among overlapping populations, or industry
segments, competing for roughly similar resources
and customers. In this sense, these papers examine
horizontal interdependencies.
Yet, as Negro and Sorenson (2005, 2006) elabo-
rated, some of these same insights concerning inter-
dependence can be extended to vertically related
populations. In particular, the survival of firms in an
1 Recent research has shed further light on where and how such
identities are formed (e.g., McKendrick et al. 2003).
industry is not only intimately related to activities
in the focal industry, but also to activities in other
parts of the value chain such as suppliers of key
components. Multiple suppliers to an industry offer
many avenues for downstream firms to obtain com-
ponents. Resources such as physical components and
the knowledge embedded within them will be more
widely available the more suppliers there are. More-
over, the cost of these resources will be lower than they
would be under more concentrated upstream regimes
because of upstream competition (de Fontenay and
Gans 2005, Salinger 1988).
The density of upstream suppliers can also affect
downstream firms in ways beyond these direct eco-
nomic effects. Increased supplier density not only
ensures that downstream manufacturers can obtain
the supplies they need, perhaps from multiple sources,
but can also increase the variety of upstream resources
available, thus supporting greater variation (and con-
sequently enhanced survival prospects) in the organi-
zational population downstream. Moreover, increased
variety can also promote greater innovation in the
downstream industry as there is greater exposure to
alternative approaches and ideas.
Which upstream supplier populations matter?
Although commodity inputs may affect downstream
survival through the simple mechanics of supply and
demand—for example, a sharp increase in the price
of jet fuel can affect the survival of airlines—the den-
sity of commodity suppliers typically will not affect
downstream exit.2 More generally, inputs that are so
generic as to be useful in a wide range of industries
are unlikely to offer the above-described advantages.
In contrast, components that promote substantial vari-
ety in the downstream population and allow organiza-
tions in the downstream population to achieve either
a higher differentiation or lower cost position relative
to the competition are most likely to affect the differ-
ential survival rates of downstream firms. We call the
providers of such components “core” upstream indus-
tries and populations. As noted in our discussion
below of vertical integration, core industries are char-
acterized by potential specialization or cospecializa-
tion of inputs or assets (Williamson 1985), where the
downstream industry is either unilaterally dependent
upon the upstream industry for specialized or spe-
cific inputs, or the downstream and upstream indus-
tries have made cospecialized specific investments.
For example, bumpers, fasteners, and sun visors are
unlikely to be core supplier industries to the auto-
mobile industry because they offer little in the way
2 By definition, commodity inputs are priced at the marginal cost
of the marginal competitor such that increased density of suppli-
ers will not reduce margins, and commodity inputs do not offer
variety.
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of substantial differentiation or lower cost to a focal
automobile manufacturer relative to other automobile
manufacturers. In contrast, transmissions, engines,
and onboard electronics all involve specific invest-
ments both upstream and downstream and are core
component suppliers to the automobile industry that
can have large impacts on the differentiation and cost
position of the firm and impact firm survival substan-
tially (Argyres and Bigelow 2007, Novak and Stern
2008). Overall, upstream providers of core compo-
nents expand the definition of the resource space that
organizations access. Thus, an increase in the density
of upstream core firms enhances the carrying capac-
ity of the downstream industry, but the reverse is not
true through this theoretical mechanism. Formally:
4t5∝ exp
( k∑
0
1knUkt +2nDt +3n2Dt
)
1 (3)
where nUkt is the population density of core upstream
industry k at time t, and nDt is the downstream
population density at time t. In the absence of ver-
tical integration, then, we would expect organiza-
tional mortality rates of downstream firms to decline
with increases in density of core upstream suppliers
(1k < 0 in Equation (3)).
Although this is a useful theoretical baseline, indus-
tries characterized by potential specialization of assets
or inputs typically exhibit positive levels of vertical
integration. We now turn our attention to the effect
of integration in both the upstream and downstream
industries on downstream survival rates.
Effect of Vertical Integration
The literature on vertical integration is vast and has
been a favorite of economists and sociologists for
decades. At the risk of oversimplification, theories of
vertical integration can be grouped under three broad
motivations: efficiency, market power, and reduction
of uncertainty.3 The first category proposes that firms
integrate to operate more efficiently. Vertical inte-
gration can enhance efficiency if it reduces “double
marginalization.” Consider the case of an upstream
firm that sells components to a downstream buyer
at a price that gives it a supracompetitive profit
margin—in other words, price above marginal cost.
The downstream firm that buys these components
in turn sells its end products to consumers at a
price higher than marginal cost. In this case, the
price of the final product will be inefficiently higher
and quantity produced inefficiently lower than what
a profit-maximizing integrated firm would produce.
3 A fourth approach is institutional isomorphism, which predicts
that firms will choose to integrate if other firms are integrated.
However, it does not specify how the first firm becomes integrated;
hence we omit it from this discussion.
Vertical integration solves the double marginalization
problem by internalizing incentives of the two firms,
reducing prices of the end product, enhancing profits
for the integrated firm, and increasing social welfare
(Besanko et al. 2007).4
Vertical integration can also enhance efficiency
by reducing the threat of hold-up and thus facili-
tating investment in specialized assets (Williamson
1985, Grossman and Hart 1986). When actors invest
in transaction-specific investments, they often place
themselves at risk of opportunistic behavior by their
exchange partners. Although actors attempt to reduce
this risk via detailed contractual arrangements, not all
contingencies can be specified in a contract; hence,
actors may refuse to make ex ante investments due
to the fear of ex post opportunistic behavior at con-
tract renegotiation. To solve this problem, under cer-
tain conditions firms will integrate. Such integration
leads to more efficient investment and production.
The market power view of vertical integration
argues that firms integrate to enhance their position
relative to the competition. In the extreme, a down-
stream firm that integrates into upstream produc-
tion of components will have an incentive to weaken
its nonintegrated downstream rivals by refusing to
sell components to them at all—in economic terms,
it “vertically forecloses” its rivals (Ordover et al.
1990). In a somewhat more benign version of this the-
ory, the vertically integrated producer will not fore-
close the downstream competitor, but will charge its
rivals a higher price for components in an attempt
to raise rivals’ costs (Salop and Scheffman 1983). This
branch of study has spawned a large game-theoretic
literature that demonstrates when vertical integra-
tion may be optimal to increase market power in
oligopolistic markets (e.g., Salinger 1988, Rey and
Tirole 2007).
The third approach to vertical integration focuses
on organizations’ dependence on resources and their
desire to reduce uncertainty in the acquisition of these
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). According to
resource dependence theory, resources are dispersed
throughout the economy, endowing some firms with
better positions to access these resources than others.
Those firms afflicted by poor access to resources will
become dependent upon those that have privileged
access and thus become exploited by the resource-
rich firms. To solve this problem, firms may verti-
cally integrate. More recent work on this question
has focused not just on dyad-specific dependence on
physical resources, but upon the entire social network,
4 Double marginalization issues may be particularly acute in the
face of economies of scale (Hortacsu and Syverson 2007) and severe
asymmetric information about production processes.
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a firm’s position within the network, and a broader
set of resources such as information (e.g., Burt 1992).
Although these three lenses propose alternative
motivations for vertical integration, they share four
commonalities. First, each of the three lenses invokes
some notion of firm or industry specialization to jus-
tify the integration decision.5 Second, each implies that
the benefits of resources generated by a vertically inte-
grated upstream division accrue primarily or exclu-
sively to its downstream division rather than to the
downstream population at large. Third, each implies
that if vertically integrated firms have specialized
assets or positional advantages, then they are likely
to generate more intense competition for rivals than
nonintegrated firms, because of more efficient pro-
duction or privileged access to key resources. Fourth,
each relies on an equilibrium analysis of organiza-
tions and on strategic interactions of small numbers
of firms, each of which has some market power; as
such, they are somewhat divorced from ecological the-
ory, which posits a more dynamic approach to indus-
try evolution that encompasses populations consisting
of dozens or hundreds of firms of which few actually
exert market power (for an exception, see Nickerson
and Silverman 2003).
We incorporate these ideas of specialization from
the vertical integration literature into our theory to
explain how integration of core industry suppliers
will affect the failure rates for firms in the down-
stream industry. Going forward, we consider only
core suppliers. For clarity, Figure 1 illustrates the
five types of upstream vertical integration. Case A
denotes an independent (or nonintegrated) set of
upstream and downstream firms, characterized by
arms-length vertical relationships. Case B denotes the
classic fully integrated structure, where an upstream
division transfers all of its output to its down-
stream division. Case C denotes a form of partial (or
“tapered”) integration in which the upstream divi-
sion transfers all of its production to its downstream
division, but the downstream division also purchases
additional units from outside suppliers. In case D, the
upstream division sells components to both its internal
downstream division and on the open market. Finally,
case E is a combination of cases C and D where the
firm sources engines both internally and externally,
and supplies engines both internally as well as to
competitors. Thus, there are six types of firms (if we
count the nonintegrated case as two separate firms—
an upstream and a downstream firm).
5 This is explicit in the transaction-cost, market-power, and
resource-dependence literatures, where vertical integration deci-
sions are triggered by the need to access resources whose provision
via thick markets is problematic. It is also a crucial, if less explicit,
aspect of the double-marginalization approach, because a supplier
can charge a supracompetitive price only if competitors cannot
provide a substitute on the open market.
Figure 1 Vertical Integration Structures
A B C D E
Earlier we argued that an increase in the density
of core suppliers will lower failure rates for down-
stream firms. However, the resource effect is not
likely to be the same for all core upstream suppliers.
Fully integrated upstream firms—those vertically inte-
grated suppliers that sell exclusively to downstream
divisions—will not convey the same level of benefits
regarding firm failure rates in the downstream indus-
try as nonintegrated suppliers. In an ecological sense,
the average downstream firm enjoys far more access to
the resources provided by independent, nonintegrated
upstream suppliers than it does to those provided
by fully integrated suppliers. With fewer independent
suppliers, downstream firms find themselves in com-
petition for components—components for which they
will likely have to pay higher prices because there are
fewer suppliers to access. Moreover, the expertise and
knowledge resources that reside in the captive sup-
pliers are unlikely to be easily disseminated to down-
stream firms (de Figueiredo and Teece 1996).
For similar reasons, partially integrated suppliers—
who sell some of their components on the open mar-
ket and some to their downstream divisions—will
have an intermediate effect on access to resources.
Consequently, the density of partially integrated sup-
pliers will reduce the exit rate of downstream firms
more than that of fully integrated suppliers, but less
than that of nonintegrated suppliers:
4t5 ∝ exp
( k∑
0
1kn
VI
Ukt +
k∑
0
2kn
PI
Ukt
+
k∑
0
3kn
NI
Ukt +2nDt +3n2Dt
)
1 (4)
where the last two terms are identical to those in
Equation (3), and nVIUkt , n
PI
Ukt , and n
NI
Ukt are the den-
sity of the vertically integrated upstream firms, par-
tially integrated upstream firms, and nonintegrated
upstream firms in core industry k, respectively. This
represents a decomposition of the nUkt in Equation (3)
to reflect the distinct effect of each governance
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form among suppliers. The theory predicts that 1k,
2k, and 3k should all have negative coefficients—
lowering the hazard rates of downstream firms—and
their relative effects should conform to 3k < 2k <
1k < 0. In other words, independent suppliers have
the strongest effect on decreasing downstream hazard
rates, partially integrated suppliers have a moderate
effect, and captive suppliers have the smallest effect
on decreasing downstream hazard rates.
Hypothesis 1A (H1A). Organizational mortality rates
of downstream firms will decline more steeply with
increases in the density of nonintegrated upstream suppli-
ers in core supplier industries than with increases in the
density of partially integrated suppliers in core supplier
industries (3k <2k < 0 in Equation (4)).
Hypothesis 1B (H1B). Organizational mortality rates
of downstream firms will decline more steeply with
increases in the density of partially integrated upstream
suppliers in core supplier industries than with increases in
the density of fully integrated suppliers in core supplier
industries (2k <1k < 0 in Equation (4)).
Hypothesis 1C (H1C). Organizational mortality rates
of downstream firms will decline more steeply with
increases in the density of nonintegrated upstream suppli-
ers in core supplier industries than with increases in the
density of fully integrated suppliers in core supplier indus-
tries (3k <1k < 0 in Equation (4)).
We next examine how downstream firms that are
vertically integrated into core supplier industries will
affect downstream firm failure rates.6 Generally, verti-
cally integrated firms will enhance competition down-
stream and diminish life chance for all firms in the
industry. First, as Negro and Sorenson (2006) note,
vertically integrated firms can better coordinate and
thus mitigate certain types of uncertainty by rely-
ing on internal rather than external resources. This
absorption of internal resources means fewer external
resources for all firms, and for nonintegrated firms
in particular. If supply becomes tight upstream, then
the downstream divisions that have captive suppli-
ers will be first in line to receive the restricted sup-
ply. Second, a vertically integrated firm has made
a revealed preference investment in upstream assets
that are likely specific to the downstream provider
(Williamson 1985). Because the assets are relationship
specific and are likely to be accompanied with spe-
cialized capabilities to use these assets, the assets and
techniques are unlikely to be valuable in second use
6 To some extent, integration from the downstream view is the flip
side of integration of the upstream view, because several of the
mechanisms that make a captive supplier less beneficial to the aver-
age downstream firm also enhance the competitive intensity gen-
erated by the captive supplier’s downstream division. However,
some mechanisms differ, as described in this section.
(Klein et al. 1978). Thus the investments are largely
sunk. This will raise the probability that a vertically
integrated downstream firm will stay in the indus-
try and compete fiercely when others would find it
advantageous to exit. Said differently, the firm is more
committed to the industry than nonintegrated firms
(Ghemawat 1991). Overall, firms that are vertically
integrated into core supplier industries are likely to
gain an advantaged position in the competition for
resources and are likely to fight to stay in the industry
longer under adverse conditions.
Note that this does not mean that vertical integra-
tion is a superior form of organization relative to mar-
kets. Indeed, our paper does not theorize about the
survival rates of vertically integrated firms.7 Rather,
we focus on the competitive effect that vertically inte-
grated firms, partially integrated firms and nonin-
tegrated firms exert on other firms in the industry.
To the extent that vertical integration provides prefer-
ential access to resources and incurs high sunk costs
through the mechanisms articulated above, vertically
integrated firms will be more intense competitors
than nonintegrated firms, and thus will decrease sur-
vival rates for all rivals more than will nonintegrated
firms.
Partially integrated firms in core supplier indus-
tries will also exhibit similar effects on competi-
tive pressure in the industry, although likely not as
strong as those for fully integrated firms. Partially
integrated firms will enjoy some of the coordination
advantage and uncertainty mitigation that integrated
firms have and will be a partial resource provider.
Partially integrated firms will have the opportunity to
be a dedicated supplier to their downstream division
when components are in short supply; however, to
maintain their downstream customers, they will likely
allocate resources to downstream nonintegrated firms
as well. And to supply nonintegrated customers as
well as their own downstream divisions, their assets
are unlikely to be as specialized as their fully inte-
grated competitors (Williamson 1985). Consequently,
such firms are less likely than fully integrated firms to
persist in the industry under adverse circumstances.
Overall, because they combine both preferential access
to some resources and industry competition for the
remaining components, partially integrated firms will
not have the same level of resource access and sunk
costs that fully integrated firms will possess, and thus
will be intermediate in the level of competitive inten-
sity they exert on competitors.8 We formalize these
7 There is a robust literature on the advantages and disadvantages
of vertical integration; e.g., Williamson (1985, 1996), Macher and
Richman (2008).
8 Again, in this paper we do not comment on whether partial inte-
gration is a superior form of organization. We focus only on the
competitive pressures that these firms exert.
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ideas by extending Equation (3) in a comparative
static sense as follows:
4t5 ∝ exp
( k∑
1
knUkt +1nVIDt +24nVIDt52 +3nPIDt
+44nPIDt52 +5nNIDt +64nNIDt 52
)
1 (5)
where the first term is the same as in Equation (3), and
the next six terms represent the density of different
organization forms in the downstream industry; nVIDt ,
nF IDt , and n
NI
Dt are the densities of downstream firms
that are vertically integrated, partially integrated, and
nonintegrated in core supplier industries. These three
variables, and their values raised to second power,
are a decomposition of nDt term in Equation (3).
We expect that the effects of integrated-rival density
on firm failure will be stronger than those of den-
sity of less integrated rivals. For the reasons noted
above, these more integrated firms compete more
intensely for resources in the organizational field,
making it more difficult for other firms to survive in
the industry:
Hypothesis 2A (H2A). Organizational mortality rates
of downstream firms will increase more steeply with
increases in the density of fully integrated (into core sup-
plier industries) rivals than with increases in the density of
partially integrated rivals (the combined effect of 1 +2 >
3 +4, in Equation (5)).
Hypothesis 2B (H2B). Organizational mortality rates
of downstream firms will increase more steeply with
increases in the density of partially integrated (into core
supplier industries) rivals than with increases in the
density of nonintegrated rivals (the combined effect of
3 +4 >5 +6, in Equation (5)).
Hypothesis 2C (H2C). Organizational mortality rates
of downstream firms will increase more steeply with
increases in the density of fully integrated (into core sup-
plier industries) rivals than with increases in the density
of nonintegrated rivals (the combined effect of 1 +2 >
5 +6, in Equation (5)).
If we integrate H1A–H1C and H2A–H2C into a sin-
gle equation, we obtain Equation (6) for the fully spec-
ified econometric model:
4t5∝exp
( k∑
0
1kn
VI
Ukt+
k∑
0
2kn
PI
Ukt+
k∑
0
3kn
NI
Ukt+1nVIDt
+24nVIDt52 +3nPIDt+44nPIDt52 +5nNIDt +64nNIDt 52
)
0
(6)
Finally, we explore asymmetric competition by
adopting and extending the approach of Negro and
Sorenson (2006). Per their argument, there is reason
to expect that vertically integrated firms will gen-
erate greater competitive pressure on nonintegrated
firms than on other integrated firms. To the extent
that an integrated firm generates pressure by control-
ling access to a core input, this pressure will be felt
more intensely by a firm that must rely on the market
for its inputs than by a firm that has its own inter-
nal supply. At the same time, as Negro and Sorenson
(2006) note, nonintegrated firms are likely to generate
less competitive pressure on integrated firms than on
other nonintegrated firms because of the privileged
position the integrated firms enjoy in the competition
for resources.
Extending this line of reasoning, there is reason
to expect that the density of upstream suppliers will
generate greater benefits for nonintegrated down-
stream firms than for integrated firms. To the extent
that an integrated firm is buffered from market com-
petition for access to a core input, such a firm should
be relatively unaffected by the density of alterna-
tive suppliers. In contrast, a nonintegrated firm must
depend upon the market to provide the input; conse-
quently, the density of suppliers should strongly affect
the fortunes of such a firm. Partially integrated sup-
pliers, according to this logic, would have an inter-
mediate effect.
Operationalizing this in the context of Equations (5)
and (6) would involve separating the samples by
organization type (integrated and nonintegrated) and
running hazard rate models. When doing this, the the-
ory would predict the following outcomes.
Hypothesis 3A (H3A). The density of vertically inte-
grated rivals (integrated into core supplier industries) will
increase failure rates of nonintegrated firms more than fail-
ure rates of integrated firms.
Hypothesis 3B (H3B). The density of nonintegrated
rivals (not integrated into core supplier industries) will
increase failure rates of nonintegrated firms more than fail-
ure rates of integrated firms.
Hypothesis 3C (H3C). The density of upstream sup-
pliers in core supplier industries will decrease failure rates
of nonintegrated firms more than failure rates of integrated
firms.
Together, H1A–H1C, H2A–H2C, and H3A–H3C
combine the vertical integration literature from the
economics and management literature with the orga-
nizational ecology framework to make predictions
about firm entry and survival. We bring data from the
laser printer and laser engine industries to examine
the validity the predictive power of these hypotheses.
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Methods
Empirical Context
As the personal computer market expanded in the
1980s, so too did the market for desktop printers,
which we define as printers that produce up to
24 pages per minute and have dimensions that allow
placement on a table as opposed to the floor. Hewlett-
Packard introduced the first desktop laser printer for
the retail market in 1984. By the end of 1985, seven
firms had introduced 10 models of printers. At its
peak in 1991, the industry had 102 firms, but by 1996
the number of firms had fallen to 84.
A desktop laser printer is made, essentially, of three
main components—a laser engine, a controller card
(the electronics), and exterior features such as toner
cartridge, feeder tray, and plastic outside box. To cre-
ate a printed page, the paper passes from the feeder
tray to the laser engine, where the page is electrically
charged. Fine-grain toner of the opposite charge is
attracted to the paper, heated, and fused to the page
by the fuser assembly of the laser engine. The paper is
then ejected to the exterior paper tray. The controller
card governs the process and provides the many fea-
tures that a given laser printer offers.
Of these components, the laser engine is the most
expensive, is a key differentiating component of the
laser printer in product space, is highly specialized
to laser printers, and is subject to the most variation
in organizational governance. Controller cards, the
other potentially differentiating component, are made
in-house by the vast majority of laser printer pro-
ducers. Conversely, virtually all laser printer makers
purchase exterior features, which are essentially com-
modity components, on the open market. For these
reasons, we consider the laser engine a core compo-
nent and focus on the laser engine–laser printer nexus
in the remainder of this paper.
There is substantial variation in production of laser
engines, with nearly 25% of laser printer firms mak-
ing at least some of their engines in-house. From
the perspective of the engine manufacturers, approx-
imately 72% of laser engine producers sell at least
some of their engines to other firms. Canon is
the dominant engine supplier, with approximately
a 60% market share throughout the sample period
(including in-house shipments that comprise a small
amount of market share). Thus, the laser engine is
the upstream focus for this study. Figure 2 shows the
entry and exit patterns of vertically integrated and
vertically disintegrated laser printer firms, whereas
Figure 3 shows these patterns for laser engine firms.
Data Construction
Following de Figueiredo and Kyle (2005, 2006), we
compiled life histories of each product and firm in
the desktop laser printer industry from its inception
Figure 2 Density of Laser Printer Firms, 1984–1996
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in 1984 through 1996. Our primary data source was
Dataquest’s annual SpecCheck report on page print-
ers, which is the single most comprehensive public
database on these printers. SpecCheck provides infor-
mation on a variety of printer characteristics including
name of printer manufacturer, name of engine manu-
facturer, initial ship date, and number of units shipped
in the year. We supplemented this data source with
information from PC Magazine and PC World. In addi-
tion, we obtained further quantity data from a sep-
arate, nonpublic Dataquest market research database
and from a private consulting firm that had engaged in
a long-term study of the laser printer industry. Finally,
we filled in missing data on the identity of engine
manufacturer for nearly 500 printer models via exten-
sive searches of websites dedicated to laser printer
Figure 3 Density of Laser Engine Firms, 1984–1996
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maintenance.9 We believe that the resulting data set is
the most comprehensive available for the laser printer
and laser engine industries. Over the 13-year period,
we record 4,317 printer-year observations that aggre-
gate up to 917 firm-year observations; 703 of these
observations are for nonintegrated firms, 136 are for
fully integrated firms, and 78 are for partially inte-
grated firms. We observe 41 exits of laser printer firms
in the data (and three exits of laser engine firms).
To test our hypotheses, we analyze organizatio-
nal exit from the laser printer industry. Consequen-
tly, we construct a dependent variable identifying
instances of exit.
Exitjt is a categorical variable set equal to 1 if printer
firm j exits the laser printer industry during year t,
and 0 otherwise. Printer firm j exits the laser printer
industry when it ceases to ship all products in the
industry. Note that retailers may continue to have
inventory even after the producer ceases shipments.
If firm j withdraws one or more products but contin-
ues to sell at least one other product in the industry,
then it does not exit the industry. If firm j is acquired
by another firm, this is not coded as an exit but rather
as a right-censored observation.
Our hypotheses focus on the effects of integrated
versus nonintegrated engine firm density and inte-
grated versus nonintegrated printer firm density on
the exit rate of a focal printer firm j . We construct
density measures as follows.
EngineDensityt is a count of the number of laser
engine firms operating at the beginning of year t.
This includes independent laser engine firms that sell
all of their products on the open market, fully ver-
tically integrated producers, and partially integrated
firms that both sell on the market and sell to a down-
stream division. Although we do not formally test a
hypothesis using EngineDensity, we have a baseline
expectation that the coefficient for EngineDensity will
be negative.
EngineSellSomeDensityt is a count of the number
of laser engine firms that sell at least some of their
engines on the open market at the beginning of year t,
and EngineUseAllDensityt is a count of the number of
laser engine firms whose engine production is entirely
consumed by a downstream laser printer division.
To further distinguish levels of integration, we dis-
aggregate EngineSellSomeDensity into EngineSellAll-
Density and EngineSell&UseDensity, which are counts
of the number of laser engine firms that sell only on
the open market and that both use engines in-house
and sell on the open market, respectively.
9 For example, see http://www.fixyourowncomputer.com. We iden-
tified the engine supplier for all but six printer models, produced
by one of two printer firms. Each of these firms relied on a single
engine supplier for all of its other printers. We assume that the
same engine supplier was used for these models. Our results are
unaffected by dropping these models.
PrinterDensityt is a count of the number of laser
printer firms operating at the beginning of year t, and
PrinterDensity2t is the square of PrinterDensityt . A long
literature in organizational ecology finds that the den-
sity of firms has a U-shaped effect on the exit rate of
a focal firm in that industry (see Hannan et al. 2007
for a review). Consequently, we expect that the coeffi-
cient on PrinterDensity will be negative and the coef-
ficient on PrinterDensity2 will be positive, at least in
our baseline estimation.
PrinterMakeSomeDensityt is a count of the number
of laser printer firms that make at least some of their
own laser engines at the beginning of year t, Printer-
MakeSomeDensity2t is the square of PrinterMakeSome-
Densityt , PrinterBuyDensityt is a count of the number
of laser printer firms that buy all of their laser
engines at the beginning of year t, and Print-
erBuyDensity2t is the square of PrinterBuyDensityt .
To further distinguish levels of integration, we
also disaggregate PrinterMakeSomeDensity into Printer-
MakeAllDensity and PrinterMake&BuyDensity, which
are counts of the number of laser printer firms that use
only in-house engines and that use both in-house and
purchased engines, respectively.
In the above formulation, a vertically integrated
firm adds 1 to both an engine density and a printer
density measure.10
10 There is no consensus in the literature regarding the construc-
tion of densities for vertically integrated firms. We construct mea-
sures in which a vertically integrated firm contributes fully to each
stage in which it is present. An alternative approach might bor-
row from research on “fuzzy density,” in which a firm’s contri-
bution to population density is weighted by a parameter between
0 and 1 that approximates the degree of identification between
firm and category (Hannan et al. 2007). In the context of vertical
integration, this implies that each firm might have an aggregate
density contribution of 1, distributed across relevant density cate-
gories through a weighting scheme; a fully integrated firm might
add 1/2 to EngineUseAllDensity and 1/2 to PrinterMakeAllDensity.
There are a number of challenges to applying this approach to
our context. First, fuzzy density is largely concerned with legiti-
mation effects, where identification with a category is paramount.
This study focuses on competition, specifically the effect of differ-
ent types of engine firms and printer firms on competition. The
weighted-density approach used in fuzzy density research thus
addresses a qualitatively different problem. Second, given our focus
on competition, a weighted-density measure will likely quantita-
tively misattribute the competitive effects of vertical integration.
Consider a nonintegrated printer firm that acquires a nonintegrated
engine firm. Before the acquisition, each firm counts as 1 toward a
density in its stage of production. It is theoretically counterintuitive
and empirically problematic to reduce the contribution of these
firms to 1/2 toward the density in each stage, simply as a function
of the acquisition. Despite these issues with the partial counting
approach to density, in unreported models we use weighted den-
sities based on a firm’s unit sales of engines and printers. These
results are generally similar, albeit slightly weaker, than the results
reported herein. We wish to thank Glenn Carroll for his insights on
this matter.
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We also include several control variables in our esti-
mation. A firm’s size is frequently found to have a
positive effect on its survival chances. Furthermore,
one might anticipate that vertical integration is posi-
tively associated with firm size. We therefore include
lnUnitSalesjt , measured as the natural log of unit sales
of laser printers by firm j in year t. Although firm
sales can be a problematic measure because it may
conflate other key aspects of the firm’s performance
with its size—i.e., more successful firms have higher
sales and also are not likely to exit—our interest is
not in the size effect per se, but rather in controlling
for size-related relationships, which reduces concern
about this measure. Relatedly, prior research demon-
strates that firms with broader scope are less likely to
exit an industry (de Figueiredo and Silverman 2007).
We therefore include lnModelsjt , measured as the nat-
ural log of the count of printer models that firm j
ships in year t. As prior research suggests that a
firm’s level of vertical integration may affect its sur-
vival, we include AllBuyjt , which is set equal to 1 if
firm j buys all of its engines (i.e., does not produce
any engines in-house) during year t and 0 otherwise.
Finally, a firm’s age is often found to have an effect
on its survival rate. We address this by breaking a
firm’s age within the laser printer industry into time
pieces and using piecewise hazard rate modeling. In
unreported results we estimate exponential models
and include FirmAgejt , measured as the number of
years that firm j has participated in the laser printer
industry as of year t. This specification does not sig-
nificantly change the coefficients of any variables in
the model.
Regarding population-level factors, we control
for population density at time of founding with
DensityDelayj , measured as PrinterDensity for the
year in which firm j entered. We also include
lnPCUnitSalest , measured as the natural log of U.S.
personal computer units sold in year t. Because print-
ers are typically bought to support personal comput-
ers, this variable proxies for the level of latent demand
enjoyed by printers. In alternative models we replaced
lnPCUnitSalest with lnPCInstalledBaset , measured as
the natural log of the installed base of personal com-
puters in the United States, which is an alternative
measure of the latent demand for laser printers. The
results are essentially identical.11
11 Although standards frequently affect competition in technology-
based industries, in the laser printer industry different standards
required only modest changes to the controller card, and the stan-
dards were freely available (with the exception of Postscript before
1990, which required a license fee). There were four major stan-
dards: HPPCL, Postscript, Diablo, and Epson. Only one-quarter
of our observations describe firms whose printers are based on a
single standard. More than 40% describe firms whose printers are
based on three or more standards.
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for our
variables. The average firm is 4.4 years old, ships
slightly more than 26,000 units per year, and offers
five printer models. Approximately 25% of laser
printer firms make at least some of their engines, and
approximately 28% of laser engine firms are entirely
captive to downstream laser printer producers. The
correlation matrix indicates medium to high correla-
tions between some variables—notably, between
printer firm density and engine firm density. We con-
duct several tests to determine the extent of multi-
collinearity, described below, which lead us to
conclude that multicollinearity is a moderate but not
fatal concern for this study.
Results
To test our hypotheses, we estimate piecewise expo-
nential hazard rate models of the probability that
firm j exits the laser printer industry in year t.12 Table 2
presents results from our tests of H1A–H1C con-
cerning the effect of density in the upstream engine
industry—distinguished between integrated and non-
integrated engine firms—on exit rates in the down-
stream printer industry. Models 1 and 2 estimate
traditional baseline models from the prior literature.
Models 3 and 4 extend Models 1 and 2 by includ-
ing a measure of engine firm density corresponding
with Equation (3) above. Models 5 and 6 introduce the
governance-based measures of engine density.
Governance Structures Upstream
Two observations before turning to an assessment
of H1A–H1C. First, the coefficients on the conven-
tional density measures in the baseline models are
consistent with prior ecological research. In Model 2,
the coefficients on PrinterDensity and PrinterDensity2
are negative and positive, reflecting the conventional
U-shaped effect of density on a printer firm’s exit
rate. The combined effect turns positive at a den-
sity of 49 firms, well within the observed range of
data. Because we are able to replicate the core empir-
ical finding in the organizational ecology literature,
we have some confidence that our subsequent results
are not an artifact of idiosyncratic data. Second, the
coefficients on the control variables are consistent
across all six estimations, with lnUnitSales always
negative, AllBuy always positive, and the other vari-
ables almost always insignificant. Greater sales are
associated with lower exit rate for a printer firm—
a standard-deviation increase in unit sales decreases
a firm’s exit rate by 73%—whereas a printer firm that
12 The results are robust to alternative pieces and to alternative
hazard rate specifications. Note that the piecewise method “costs”
one observation per firm, so that our N for the estimations is 793
rather than 917.
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produces no engines in-house is significantly more
likely to exit than one that produces at least some of
its own engines. We now turn to H1A–H1C.
In Models 3–6 we include our various mea-
sures of upstream engine density. Models 3 and 4
include EngineDensity,13 which does not distinguish
different levels of integration among engine firms.
Model 5 replaces this with EngineSellSomeDensity and
EngineUseAllDensity. Model 6 replaces these with our
most fine-grained measures of integration, Engine-
SellAllDensity, EngineSell&UseDensity, and EngineUse-
AllDensity. Because the results are generally similar
across models, and because Model 6 offers the most
direct test of H1A–H1C, we focus our attention
on Model 6. The likelihood-ratio test indicates that
Model 6 offers significantly greater explanatory power
than the baseline ecological Model 2 (2435 = 9088,
p < 0005). In this model, the point estimates for
the coefficients on all three engine density vari-
ables are negative as predicted; the coefficients for
EngineSellAllDensity and EngineUseAllDensity are neg-
ative and statistically different from zero at the
99% and 95% levels of confidence, whereas the
coefficient for EngineSell&UseDensity is negative but
does not rise above the 90% level of confidence.
H1A–H1C laid out specific predictions for the rel-
ative magnitude of the coefficients on these three
variables. Holding all other variables at their mean,
a standard-deviation increase in EngineSellAllDen-
sity, EngineSell&UseDensity, and EngineUseAllDensity
decreases the exit rate of printer firms by 87%, 60%,
and 38%, respectively. This pattern is broadly consis-
tent with the predictions.
A more stringent test is to examine whether the
magnitudes of the coefficients are statistically different
from one another. To do this, we conduct a 2 test for
equality across the coefficients. Consistent with H1A
and H1C, we find that the coefficient on EngineSell-
AllDensity is significantly greater (in absolute value)
than those for either of the other engine density mea-
sures at the 95% level of confidence. However, the
coefficients on the other two measures are not sig-
nificantly different from each other, inconsistent with
H1B. Overall, then, a printer firm’s exit rate is reduced
more by increases in density of engine makers that
sell all engines that they produce than by increases
in the density of partially or fully captive engine
makers.
13 To explore whether EngineDensity has a nonlinear effect on
printer firm survival, we conducted a grid search in which
we replaced EngineDensity with EngineDensityx , where x ∈
40025100261 0 0 0 11099120005. Although the log-pseudolikelihood indi-
cates that the best fit occurs at x = 1028, the results with
EngineDensity1028 are identical to those with EngineDensity1000. The
estimations in this paper rely on EngineDensity1000 for convenience.
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Table 2 Effect of (Upstream) Engine Firm Population on Exit Rate for (Downstream) Laser Printer Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age< 10 yearsa −30829∗∗∗ −00869 −20607∗∗ −00786 −00742 −00133
4103255 4008675 4102275 4009455 4100435 4009885
Age≥ 10 yearsa −140473∗∗∗ −90785∗∗∗ −100791∗∗∗ −90813∗∗∗ −100353∗∗∗ −70828∗∗∗
4105965 4104405 4106955 4105685 4106915 4108675
PrinterDensity 00029∗∗ −00083∗∗ 00093∗∗∗ 00002 00028 00101
4000135 4000325 4000185 4000505 4000515 4000675
PrinterDensity 2/1,000 00848∗∗∗ 00607∗ 00574∗ 00110
4002845 4003145 4003005 4003705
EngineDensity −00251∗∗∗ −00203∗∗
4000745 4000885
EngineSellSomeDensity −00312∗∗
4001245
EngineSellAllDensity −10258∗∗∗
4003575
EngineSell&UseDensity −00171
4001705
EngineUseAllDensity −00179∗∗ −00230∗∗
4000885 4001115
lnUnitSales −00333∗∗∗ −00382∗∗∗ −00417∗∗∗ −00434∗∗∗ −00469∗∗∗ −00411∗∗∗
4000765 4000855 4000895 4000945 4001055 4001055
lnModels −00416 −00354 −00317 −00298 −00255 −00321
4002735 4002735 4002785 4002775 4002825 4002925
DensityDelay −00008 −00007 −00007 −00007 −00007 −00008
4000065 4000055 4000065 4000055 4000055 4000065
lnPCUnitSales −00003 00006 00012 00013 00025 00080∗∗
4000225 4000275 4000245 4000275 4000315 4000365
AllBuy 10093∗∗ 10070∗∗ 10053∗∗ 10043∗∗ 10038∗∗ 10049∗∗
4005485 4005275 4005405 4005275 4005255 4005255
N 793 793 793 793 793 793
Wald 83004∗∗∗ 72906∗∗∗ 72101∗∗∗ 76902∗∗∗ 81007∗∗∗ 79800∗∗∗
Log-pseudolikelihood −94013 −90089 −90050 −89007 −88053 −85095
Note. Piecewise exponential hazard rate estimation is shown; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
aIn unreported models we use alternative age pieces (e.g., 0–3 years, 4–9 years, 10+ years) that fit the data almost as well as the two
pieces in the above models. The results for our other variables are unchanged.
∗p < 0010; ∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001.
One pattern in the results is that the inclusion of
engine density measures in Models 3–6 reduces the
main effect of PrinterDensity to insignificance, whereas
PrinterDensity2 generally retains its positive coeffi-
cient. As noted above, there appears to be corre-
lation between the PrinterDensity and EngineDensity
variables. Although the standard errors remain rela-
tively consistent with the addition of EngineDensity,
it is possible that multicollinearity influences the loss
of significance for the negative coefficient on Printer-
Density. We pursued three avenues to assess this
potential issue. Following Sorenson and Waguespack
(2006) and Jensen (2006), we first calculated the con-
dition number for Model 3 (the results are similar, but
more complicated to describe, for Model 6). Condi-
tion numbers above 30 and 100 indicate moderate and
strong collinearity, respectively (Belsley et al. 1980).
The condition number for Model 3 is 60, indicating
moderate concern for multicollinearity. We note, how-
ever, that the bulk of multicollinearity appears to
stem from PrinterDensity and PrinterDensity2; the con-
dition number of Model 2 is 34. We next calcu-
lated variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all coef-
ficients in these models. The VIF for EngineDensity
is 15.7 in Model 3, at the edge of the commonly
used thresholds of 10–15, above which one begins
to worry about multicollinearity. As with condition
numbers, VIFs for PrinterDensity and PrinterDensity2
in Model 2 are significantly higher than those for
EngineDensity, whose value is above 24. Third, fol-
lowing Sine et al. (2005), we orthogonalized Printer-
Density, PrinterDensity2, and EngineDensity using the
ORTHOG command in STATA and reestimated our
models. Our results—notably the competitive effect
for printer firm density and the negative coefficient
on engine firm density—were generally the same or
de Figueiredo and Silverman: Firm Survival and Industry Evolution in Vertically Related Populations
1644 Management Science 58(9), pp. 1632–1650, © 2012 INFORMS
stronger in all reestimations. We conclude that multi-
collinearity introduced by EngineDensity is a moderate
concern, but that the results are sufficiently robust to
measures that address collinearity to allow reasonable
interpretation of estimated coefficients.14
Governance Structures in the Focal Population
In Table 3 we distinguish between the density of verti-
cally integrated and nonintegrated laser printer firms.
Models 7–10 estimate predictions from Equation (5),
and Models 11–13 reflect Equation (6). Models 7–8
replicate Models 3–4 from Table 2, except that
PrinterDensity is replaced by MakeSomePrinterDensity
and BuyPrinterDensity. Models 9 and 10 do the same,
except that they use our most fine-grained measures
of printer-firm integration, PrinterMakeAllDensity,
PrinterMake&BuyDensity, and PrinterBuyAllDensity.
Because the results are generally similar across mod-
els, and because Models 9 and 10 offer the most direct
test of H2A–H2C, we focus our attention on Mod-
els 9 and 10.
In Model 9, both PrinterMakeAllDensity and Printer-
Make&BuyDensity have positive coefficients, with the
coefficient on the former approximately one-third
larger than the coefficient on the latter. In contrast, the
coefficient on PrinterBuyAllDensity is not statistically
significant, and the point estimate is close to zero.
A standard-deviation decrease in PrinterMakeAll-
Density or PrinterMake&BuyDensity is associated with
a decrease in exit rate of 93% or 90%, respectively.
This pattern of coefficients and multiplier effects is
consistent with H2A–H2C. We next conduct the more
stringent 2 test of equality across all three printer
density coefficients. This test indicates that Printer-
MakeAllDensity and PrinterMake&BuyDensity generate
significantly greater competition for a focal firm than
does PrinterBuyAllDensity, consistent with H2B and
H2C. However, the difference between fully and par-
tially integrated firm density is not significant, incon-
sistent with H2A.
Model 10 includes square terms for the printer den-
sity measures. This model offers a modest improve-
ment in explanatory power over Model 9 (2435 =
40841 p < 0010). Although several of the printer density
effects are insignificant in this model, two obser-
vations stand out. First, the coefficients on Printer-
BuyAllDensity and PrinterBuyAllDensity2 are negative
14 Regressions that are affected by multicollinearity generate unbi-
ased estimates of the coefficients, but with inflated standard
errors. We note that the inclusion of EngineDensity does not change
the standard errors of other variables substantially. Furthermore,
Tables 2 and 3 indicate that our results are robust to the addi-
tion and exclusion of a range of other variables, whereas models
afflicted by multicollinearity tend to be unstable in the face of such
alterations.
and positive, respectively, suggesting that noninte-
grated printer firms generate a conventional U-shaped
effect on a focal firm’s exit rate. In contrast, the
coefficient on the main effect PrinterMakeAllDensity is
positive while the coefficient on the square term is
insignificant, implying that the density of fully inte-
grated rivals has a purely competitive effect on a
focal firm. The coefficients on PrinterMake&BuyDensity
and its square term are both statistically insignifi-
cant. At first glance, this ordering of results appears
consistent with the prediction that fully integrated
printer firms will generate the most competition for
a focal firm, followed by partially integrated firms,
followed by nonintegrated firms. Second, although
these point estimates are not statistically significant, if
we take them as unbiased estimates, then the results
are corroborated. The combined effect of the coeffi-
cients on PrinterMakeAllDensity and its square term
increases with increased density until the population
includes 18 fully integrated firms, after which the
effect becomes negative. The maximum number of
fully integrated firms in the data is 15. Hence, fully
integrated printer firms generate a purely competitive
effect throughout the observed range of data. Simi-
larly, the combined effect of the coefficients on Printer-
Make&BuyDensity and its square term increases until
13 firms; the maximum number of partially integrated
firms in the data is 11. In contrast, the combined
effect of the coefficients on PrinterBuyAllDensity and
its square term decreases with density until 68 firms.
The maximum number of nonintegrated printer firms
is 77; the density of nonintegrated printer firms equals
or exceeds 68 in more than one-third of the years in
our data. Again, this ordering of results appears con-
sistent with the predictions of H2A–H2C: fully inte-
grated printer firms will generate the most competi-
tion for a focal firm, followed by partially integrated
firms, followed by nonintegrated firms.
In Models 11–13, we replicate Models 7–9 except
that we replace EngineDensity with the appropri-
ate governance-based measures of engine firm den-
sity.15 Again, because results are generally consis-
tent across models, we focus on the most direct
test of our predictions, Model 13. The ordering and
significance of the coefficients on the three mea-
sures of printer density remain identical to those in
Model 10; fully and partially integrated rivals gen-
erate more competition than do nonintegrated rivals.
The 2 test of equality of coefficients again finds
that the coefficients on PrinterMakeAllDensity and
15 Ideally, we would also replicate Model 10 but replace Engine-
Density with EngineSellAllDensity, EngineSell&UseDensity, and
EngineUseAllDensity. Despite our best efforts, this model does not
converge to a stable result.
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Table 3 Effect of Fully vs. Partially vs. Nonintegrated Printer Firm Density on Printer Firm Exit Rate
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Age< 10 years −10442 −10040 −20360 −00616 −00529 10065 10237
4101675 4102515 4106975 4103155 4102265 4108755 4202125
Age≥ 10 years −100890∗∗∗ −90396∗∗∗ −90932∗∗∗ −70727∗∗∗ −60067∗∗ −40353 00132
4108845 4108195 4201755 4200785 4209985 4407175 4702005
PrinterMakeSomeDensity 00644∗∗∗ 00072 10093∗∗∗ 20434
4001995 4100355 4003005 4107795
PrinterMakeSomeDensity 2 00011 −00025
4000225 4000325
PrinterMakeAllDensity 00723∗∗∗ 20717∗ 10467∗∗
4002085 4104575 4006245
PrinterMakeAllDensity 2 −00077
4000565
PrinterMake&BuyDensity 00554∗∗ 10048 10320∗∗
4002345 4007005 4006095
PrinterMake&BuyDensity 2 −00041
4000455
PrinterBuyAllDensity −00037 00071 −00038 −00686∗ −00015 −00370 00063
4000495 4003105 4000575 4004145 4000605 4004245 4001045
PrinterBuyAllDensity 2/1,000 −00519 40707∗ 20482
4200385 4206885 4208315
EngineDensity −00392∗∗∗ −00339∗∗ −00384∗∗∗ −00169
4001175 4001325 4001125 4001965
EngineSellSomeDensity −00904∗∗∗ −10136∗∗
4003025 4005505
EngineSellAllDensity −20193∗∗
4100335
EngineSell&UseDensity −10219∗
4006285
EngineUseAllDensity −00501∗∗ −00623∗ −00797∗
4002115 4003365 4004205
lnUnitSales −00367∗∗∗ −00396∗∗∗ −00358∗∗∗ −00407∗∗∗ −00448∗∗∗ −00443∗∗∗ −00420∗∗∗
4000855 4000945 4000845 4001005 4001085 4001105 4001065
lnModels −00373 −00337 −00387 −00318 −00265 −00271 −00302
4002815 4002785 4002825 4002825 4002865 4002865 4002875
DensityDelay −00007 −00007 −00008 −00007 −00007 −00007 −00007
4000065 4000065 4000065 4000065 4000055 4000055 4000065
lnPCUnitSales −00003 −00004 00023 00064 −00017 −00033 00011
4000265 4000295 4000365 4000505 4000415 4000545 4000795
AllBuy 10055∗∗ 10048∗∗ 10063∗∗ 10055∗∗ 10041∗∗ 10040∗ 10054∗∗
4005325 4005235 4005335 4005195 4005225 4005225 4005175
N 793 793 793 793 793 793 793
Wald 83604∗∗∗ 77409∗∗∗ 74104∗∗∗ 75109∗∗∗ 72900∗∗∗ 80309∗∗∗ 75905∗∗∗
Log pseudolikelihood −87020 −86072 −86060 −84018 −84059 −84026 −82090
Note. Piecewise exponential hazard rate estimation is shown; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0010; ∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001.
PrinterMake&BuyDensity are significantly larger than
that on PrinterBuyAllDensity. These results are consis-
tent with Model 10 and with H2B and H2C.
As for the effect of the different types of engine
density, Model 13 actually generates stronger sup-
port for H1B than did Model 6. The coefficients on
the three measures of engine density are all negative.
Whereas the coefficient on EngineSell&UseDensity was
insignificant and did not lie between the coefficients
on EngineSellAllDensity and EngineUseAllDensity in
Model 6 of Table 2, in Model 13 the coefficient is
both statistically significant at p < 0010 and between
the coefficients on the polar forms of engine gov-
ernance, consistent with H1B. A 2 test of equality
of coefficients now finds that Engine-UseAllDensity>
EngineSell&UseDensity (20781 p < 0010), EngineSell&
UseDensity > EngineSellAllDensity (20701 p < 0010),
and EngineUseAllDensity> Engine-SellAllDensity (40191
p < 0005). We interpret this as additional, and in fact
less equivocal, support for H1A–H1C.
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Asymmetric Competition
H3A–H3C predict that printer firm densities will affect
a focal firm differently depending on its own level
of integration. One way to test this is to run identi-
cal models separately on different subsamples of focal
firms, based on their levels of integration (Negro and
Sorenson 2006). In Table 4 we estimate such models.
Three caveats loom over these tests. First, there are no
exits among the 11 partially integrated firms in our
sample, and only three exits among the 15 fully inte-
grated firms. As a result, we cannot estimate models
for partially integrated firms, and instead we compare
nonintegrated firms to firms with any positive level
of integration. Second, because of the limited num-
ber of exits among integrated firms, the fully specified
models do not converge in the statistical algorithm.
However, we can achieve convergence by omitting
two control variables that are consistently statisti-
cally insignificant in Tables 2 and 3, DensityDelay and
lnPCUnitSales. In some models we also must omit
Table 4 Asymmetric Effects of Competition
(14a) (14b) (15a) (15b) (16a) (16b) (17a) (17b) (18a) (18b)
Noninteg. Integrated Noninteg. Integrated Noninteg. Integrated Noninteg. Integrated Noninteg. Integrated
subsample subsample subsample subsample subsample subsample subsample subsample subsample subsample
Time pieces Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
PrinterMakeSomeDensity 00300∗ 00670 −00308 290443
4001665 4004665 4002845 43306685
PrinterMakeSomeDensity 2 00013∗∗∗ −00619
4000045 4006985
PrinterMakeAllDensity 00511∗∗∗ 00650∗∗∗ −00222 −10315
4001965 4002015 4004105 4608875
PrinterMakeAllDensity 2 00025∗ 00050
4000145 4002785
PrinterMake&BuyDensity 00236 00664∗ 00204 00189∗
4001745 4003805 4001845 4001055
PrinterMake&BuyDensity 2
PrinterBuyAllDensity −00196∗∗∗ 170840 −00005 −00053 −00269∗∗∗ 170546 −00050 00173
4000665 41908155 4000655 4001635 4000775 41506875 4000655 4002235
PrinterBuyAllDensity 2/1,000 00001∗∗∗ −00122 00001∗∗∗ −00120
4000005 4001375 4000005 4001085
PrinterDensity 00113∗∗∗ 00262∗∗∗
4000365 4001025
EngineSellAllDensity −10021∗∗∗ 20105
4002745 4103165
EngineSell&UseDensity −00216 −00498
4001465 4103465
EngineUseAllDensity −00233∗∗ −40794
4001105 4306625
lnUnitSales −00342∗∗∗ −00230 −00359∗∗∗ −00168 −00351∗∗∗ −00228 −00296∗∗∗ −00150 −00390∗∗∗ −00294
4000895 4002965 4000925 4001325 4000905 4002775 4000825 4000975 4001035 4002055
lnModels −00289 −10405∗∗∗ −00268 −10171∗∗ −00236 −10411∗∗∗ −00319 −10377∗∗∗ −00175 −10184∗∗
4002825 4005025 4002815 4005325 4002975 4004495 4002955 4003575 4003075 4005715
N 601 192 601 192 601 192 601 192 601 192
Wald 70107∗∗∗ 5604∗∗∗ 69207∗∗∗ 16407∗∗∗ 70008∗∗∗ 7604∗∗∗ 79307∗∗∗ 6208∗∗∗ 70804∗∗∗ 91102∗∗∗
Log pseudolikelihood −83070 −6005 −83031 −6010 −81050 −6006 −83091 −6047 −81029 −3091
Note. Piecewise exponential hazard rate estimation is shown; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0010; ∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001.
EngineDensity to achieve convergence. Third, we can-
not obtain convergence when including all square
terms for printer density in the same model, and
instead introduce them one at a time. Recognizing
these limitations, we hope to gain some insights into
H3A and H3B by observing patterns of results across
multiple partially specified models.
Throughout Table 4, the “a” models estimate effects
for nonintegrated focal firms, whereas the “b” mod-
els estimate effects for integrated focal firms. Models
14a–15b include PrinterMakeSomeDensity and Printer-
BuyDensity, with PrinterBuyDensity2 introduced in
Models 14a and 14b and PrinterMakeSomeDensity2
introduced in Models 15a and 15b. Models 16a–17b
replace PrinterMakeSomeDensity with PrinterMakeAll-
Density and PrinterMake&BuyDensity. In both Models
14a and 15a, the density of integrated rivals is posi-
tively related to the exit rate of nonintegrated firms.
In contrast, in Models 14b and 15b, the density of
integrated rivals is not significantly related to the exit
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rate of integrated firms. This is consistent with H3A,
which predicted that the competitive effect of inte-
grated rivals would be more intense for nonintegrated
than for integrated focal firms. This result is slightly
qualified in Models 16a–17b, in that the density of
fully integrated rivals is positively related to the exit
rate of integrated firms in Model 16b (although this
effect becomes insignificant in 17b), and the density
of partially integrated rivals has a stronger effect on
integrated firms than on nonintegrated firms. Overall,
there is a slight preponderance of evidence consistent
with H3A, but this is at best indicative rather than
conclusive.
In Models 14a and 16a, PrinterBuyAllDensity exhibits
a U-shaped relationship with the exit rate of non-
integrated firms, with the inflection point within
the range of observed data albeit close to the
maximum level of PrinterBuyAllDensity. In contrast,
there is no significant relationship between Printer-
BuyAllDensity and the exit rate of integrated firms.
These results—notably the positive coefficient on
PrinterBuyAllDensity2 in Models 14a and 16a versus
the insignificant coefficient on PrinterBuyAllDensity2 in
Models 14b and 16b—are technically consistent with
H3B, which predicted that the competitive effect of
nonintegrated rivals would have a stronger impact
on the exit rates of nonintegrated than of integrated
firms. That said, the sizeable negative coefficient on
PrinterAllBuyDensity in Models 14a and 16a actually
makes the combined effect of PrinterAllBuyDensity
and PrinterAllBuyDensity2 negative for most of the
observed range of data.
Models 18a and 18b explore the asymmetric effect
of engine density on integrated versus nonintegrated
printer firms. In Model 18a, the coefficients on the
various types of engine firms are generally consis-
tent with those in models of the full sample: increases
in density of both nonintegrated and fully integrated
engine firms are negatively related to the exit rate of
nonintegrated printer firms, but increases in the den-
sity of nonintegrated engine firms have a significantly
greater impact. As Model 18b shows, the density of
engine firms is not significantly associated with exit
rates of integrated printer firms, who have their own
in-house engine production capacity. This is consis-
tent with H3C.
Finally, the control variables demonstrate remark-
able consistency across all models. In every “a”
model, lnUnitSales is negatively related to exit rates,
and lnModels has no effect, whereas in every “b”
model, lnModels is negatively related to exit rates, and
lnUnitSales has no effect. Put differently, economies
of scale appear to matter for nonintegrated firms
(average annual unit sales, 51241; average number of
models, 308), whereas economies of scope appear to
matter for integrated firms (average annual unit sales,
261401; average number of models, 604). One reason
for this may be that integrated firms are, on average,
larger than nonintegrated firms and thus may already
have achieved scale economies; the next margin on
which they maximize is scope economies. Noninte-
grated firms, on average, have not achieved scale, so
scale economies matter more to these firms on the
margin.
Conclusion
This paper was motivated by an opportunity in the
existing literature on industry evolution: to integrate
robust economic theories with highly developed eco-
logical approaches to understand how the density of
a vertically related population affects the exit rate
of a focal population. We predicted that density in
the population of upstream suppliers of a core spe-
cialized input would negatively affect the exit rate
within a focal (downstream) population—in particu-
lar, that this survival-enhancing relationship would be
strongest for the density of nonintegrated upstream
suppliers and weakest for the density of fully inte-
grated “captive” suppliers. Turning our attention to
the downstream industry, we predicted that vertically
integrated rivals would generate more intense compe-
tition against a focal firm than would nonintegrated
rivals in the industry. Finally, we predicted that the
above effects would be particularly intense for nonin-
tegrated focal firms—that is, integrated printer firms
would generate asymmetrically strong competition
for nonintegrated printer firms, and the presence of
upstream engine firms (especially nonintegrated firms
that sell to all comers) would be particularly benefi-
cial to nonintegrated printer firms.
We tested these predictions with data describing
the U.S. laser printer and laser engine industries from
their births in 1984 through 1996. Our analyses gen-
erally supported the predictions. In particular, our
results suggest that a laser printer firm’s survival
depends on the density of laser engine suppliers and
on the degree to which these engine suppliers sell their
products on the open market. Increases in the den-
sity of nonintegrated laser engine suppliers enhance
survival rates for laser printer firms to a significantly
greater degree than comparable increases in the den-
sity of integrated suppliers. These impacts are eco-
nomically significant: a standard-deviation increase in
the density of nonintegrated engine suppliers from the
mean level is associated with an 87% decrease in the
exit rate of printer firms (based on Model 6 in Table 2),
whereas a comparable increase in the density of fully
integrated engine suppliers is associated with a 38%
decrease in the exit rate.16 These effects represent
16 Alternatively, one can look at the marginal effect of an additional
engine firm. At the mean level of densities of nonintegrated and
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a significant influence on firm survival, particularly
given the underemphasis on vertically related pop-
ulations in the extant literature. By way of contrast,
a standard-deviation decrease in printer firm den-
sity is associated with an 89% decrease in exit rates
(in Model 5), and an analogous increase in a focal
firm’s size is associated with a 48% decrease in printer
firm exit rate.
We also find that the competition generated by
vertically integrated rivals is more intense than
that generated by nonintegrated rivals; whereas a
standard-deviation decrease from the mean in den-
sity of integrated rivals is associated with a 90%–93%
decrease in the exit rate of printer firms, a comparable
decrease in nonintegrated-rival density has a negligi-
ble impact on exit rates.
Our results concerning asymmetric competition are
mixed. The results lean toward an interpretation that
nonintegrated firms are subject to competition from
vertically integrated rivals, whereas vertically inte-
grated firms are buffered from nonintegrated-rival
competition. Similarly, the results imply that the den-
sity of engine producers affects the life chances of
nonintegrated printer firms but not those of inte-
grated printer firms. However, these results are gen-
erated from only partially specified models and are
not extremely robust.
When interpreting the results of this study, one
should keep in mind three significant limitations. First,
we have analyzed the survival-affecting impact of ver-
tically related industries, and of integration, only on
the laser printer industry. As noted above, the lack
of exits among laser engine firms precluded us from
exploring reciprocal effects on the laser engine indus-
try. Moreover, our theory examines only the unidirec-
tional effects of suppliers on buyers. Second, we lack
information on alliances or other hybrid governance
arrangements between engine firms and printer firms,
and therefore can not assess the effect of such hybrid
forms on firms’ life chances. Third, we study only the
first 13 years of the industries’ lives, and therefore
cannot explore the very long-term effect of vertical
integration on competitive dynamics. Barnett (1990)
proposed that large firms generate weaker compe-
tition as they age because they are buffered from
selection processes. To the extent that vertical integra-
tion similarly buffers firms, we might expect that the
strong competitive intensity of vertically integrated
rivals found in this study could decline in the very
long term. These limitations notwithstanding, this
study contributes to the literature on industry evolu-
tion by explicitly extending insights from community
fully integrated suppliers, an increase by one supplier is associ-
ated with decreases in printer firms’ exit rates of 66% and 22%,
respectively.
ecology to those from literatures on vertically related
industries, thus enhancing our understanding of the
features that influence firm survival and exit in evolv-
ing industries. This study thus joins a handful of other
studies that have explored how governance choices
that are made for organizational efficiency reasons
also generate competitive effects for their rivals
(Silverman and Baum 2002, Negro and Sorenson 2006,
Oxley et al. 2009).
These results suggest two lines of future research.
First, although there has long been a call for stud-
ies of “community ecology,” most of this research
has focused on horizontally related populations. Our
study demonstrates that there is value in exploring
a broader range of interdependencies among pop-
ulations. Future studies of vertical relationships in
other industries would provide evidence of the gen-
erality, or lack thereof, of this study’s findings. Stud-
ies of other forms of interdependent populations,
such as between complementary industries (i.e., com-
puter hardware producers and software producers),
would further shed light on such community pro-
cesses. Second, such studies can both benefit from
prior research in economics and sociology on vertical
or complementary relationships and help to inform
this prior research. For example, to the extent that
economic models of vertical integration offer predic-
tions about behavior under different market struc-
tures, economics can contribute to future ecological
research that generates more refined predictions of
population dynamics. Conversely, to the extent that
studies of population dynamics can shed light on
these equilibrium-based economic models, the greater
the opportunity for ecological models to elucidate
dynamic paths that are relevant for economic models.
Finally, although this paper has devoted primary
attention to the influence of an upstream industry on
the life chances of firms in a downstream industry, it is
likely that industries coevolve. The industry evolution
literature has tended to focus on the evolution of sin-
gle industries, but rarely considers such coevolution.
This paper begins to make headway in understanding
the ways in which vertically related industries co-
evolve. Further research along these lines could ulti-
mately generate a more comprehensive understanding
of coevolution that, in turn, will shed further light on
industry evolution and population dynamics.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to Glenn Carroll; Gino Cattani;
Olav Sorenson; Oliver Williamson; seminar audiences at
Columbia University, New York University, and Université
de Paris I; as well as participants at the Stanford Univer-
sity Conference on Resource Partitioning and Organizational
Dynamics and the Markets for Technology and Industry
Evolution Conference at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
for insightful comments on previous drafts of this paper.
de Figueiredo and Silverman: Firm Survival and Industry Evolution in Vertically Related Populations
Management Science 58(9), pp. 1632–1650, © 2012 INFORMS 1649
They are also grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada for funding.
References
Argyres, N. S., L. Bigelow. 2007. Does transaction misalignment
matter for firm survival at all stages of the industry life cycle?
Management Sci. 53(8) 1332–1345.
Astley, G. R. 1985. The two ecologies: Population and community
perspectives on organizational evolution. Admin. Sci. Quart.
30(20) 224–241.
Barnett, W. P. 1990. The organizational ecology of a technological
system. Admin. Sci. Quart. 35(1) 31–60.
Barnett, W. P., G. R. Carroll. 1987. Competition and mutualism
among early telephone companies. Admin. Sci. Quart. 32(3)
400–421.
Baum, J. A. C., J. V. Singh. 1994. Organizational niches and the
dynamics of organizational mortality. Amer. J. Sociol. 100(2)
346–380.
Belsley, D. A., E. Kuh, R. E. Welsch. 1980. Regression Diagnos-
tics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity. John
Wiley & Sons, New York.
Besanko, D., D. Dranove, M. Shanley, S. Schaefer. 2007. Economics
of Strategy, 4th ed. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Bigelow, L. S., G. R. Carroll, M. L. Seidel, L. Tsai. 1997. Legitima-
tion, geographical scale, and organizational density: Regional
patterns of foundings of American automobile producers,
1885–1981. Soc. Sci. Res. 26(4) 377–398.
Bonaccorsi, A., P. Giuri. 2001. The long-term evolution of vertically-
related industries. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 19(7) 1053–1083.
Burt, R. S. 1992. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Carroll, G. R., M. T. Hannan. 1989. Density dependence in the evo-
lution of populations of newspaper organizations. Amer. Sociol.
Rev. 54(4) 524–541.
Carroll, G. R., M. T. Hannan. 1995. Organizations in Industry: Strat-
egy, Structure, and Selection. Oxford University Press, New York.
Carroll, G. R., M. T. Hannan. 2000. The Demography of Corporations
and Industries. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
de Figueiredo, J. M., M. K. Kyle. 2005. Product launch decisions by
dominant and fringe firms. Acad. Management Best Paper Proc.,
TIM Division, Academy of Managment, Briarcliff Manor, NY.
de Figueiredo, J. M., M. K. Kyle. 2006. Surviving the gales of
creative destruction: The determinants of product turnover.
Strategic Management J. 27(3) 241–264.
de Figueiredo, J. M., B. S. Silverman. 2007. Churn baby churn:
Strategic dynamics among dominant and fringe firms in a seg-
mented industry. Management Sci. 53 632–650.
de Figueiredo, J. M., D. J. Teece. 1996. Mitigating procurement haz-
ards in the context of innovation. Indust. Corporate Change 5(2)
537–559.
de Fontenay, C. C., J. S. Gans. 2005. Vertical integration in the pres-
ence of upstream competition. RAND J. Econom. 36(3) 544–572.
Dobrev, S. D., T. Y. Kim. 2006. Positioning among organizations in
a population: Moves between market segments and the evolu-
tion of industry structure. Admin. Sci. Quart. 51(2) 230–261.
Dobrev, S. D., S. Z. Ozdemir, A. C. Teo. 2006. The ecological inter-
dependence of emergent and established organizational pop-
ulations: Legitimacy transfer, violation by comparison, and
unstable identities. Organ. Sci. 17(5) 577–597.
Ghemawat, P. 1991. Commitment. Free Press, New York.
Grossman, S. J., O. D. Hart. 1986. The costs and benefits of own-
ership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. J. Political
Econom. 94(4) 691–719.
Hannan, M. T., G. R. Carroll. 1992. Dynamics of Organizational
Populations. Oxford University Press, New York.
Hannan, M. T., J. Freeman. 1989. Organizational Ecology. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Hannan, M. T., L. Polos, G. R. Carroll. 2007. Logics of Organiza-
tion Theory: Audiences, Codes, and Ecologies. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ.
Hannan, M. T., G. R. Carroll, E. A. Dundon, J. C. Torres. 1995.
Organizational evolution in a multinational context: Entries
of automobile manufacturers in Belgium, Britain, France,
Germany, and Italy. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 60(4) 509–528.
Hortacsu, A., C. Syverson. 2007. Cementing relationships: Vertical
integration, foreclosures, productivity, and prices. J. Political
Econom. 115(2) 250–301.
Jensen, M. 2006. Should we stay or should we go? Accountability,
status anxiety, and client defections. Admin. Sci. Quart. 51(1)
97–128.
Jovanovic, B. 1982. Selection and the evolution of industry.
Econometrica 50 649–670.
Jovanovic, B., G. M. MacDonald. 1994. The life cycle of a competi-
tive industry. J. Political Econom. 102(2) 322–347.
Klein, B., R. G. Crawford, A. A. Alchian. 1978. Vertical integration,
appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process.
J. Law Econom. 21(2) 297–326.
Klepper, S. 1996. Entry, exit, growth, and innovation over the prod-
uct life cycle. Amer. Econom. Rev. 86(3) 562–583.
Lomi, A. 1995. The population and community ecology of organi-
zational founding: Italian co-operative banks, 1936–1989. Eur.
Sociol. Rev. 11(1) 75–98.
Macher, J. T., B. D. Richman. 2008. Transaction cost economics:
An assessment of empirical research in the social sciences. Bus.
Politics 10(1) Article 1.
McKendrick, D. G., J. Jaffee, G. R. Carroll, O. M. Khessina. 2003.
In the bud? Disk array producers as a (possibly) emergent
organizational form. Admin. Sci. Quart. 48(1) 60–93.
Negro, G., O. Sorenson. 2005. The community ecology of verti-
cally related populations. Working paper, Yale University, New
Haven, CT.
Negro, G., O. Sorenson. 2006. The competitive dynamics of verti-
cal integration: Evidence from U.S. motion picture producers,
1912–1970. Adv. Strategic Management 23 363–398.
Nickerson, J. A., B. S. Silverman. 2003. Why firms want to organize
efficiently and what keeps them from doing so: Inappropri-
ate governance, performance, and adaptation in a deregulated
industry. Admin. Sci. Quart. 48(3) 433–465.
Novak, S., S. Stern. 2008. How does outsourcing affect perfor-
mance dynamics? Evidence from the automobile industry.
Management Sci. 54(12) 1963–1979.
Ordover, J. A., G. Saloner, S. C. Salop. 1990. Equilibrium vertical
foreclosure. Amer. Econom. Rev. 80(1) 127–142.
Oxley, J. E., R. E. Sampson, B. S. Silverman. 2009. Arms race or
détente? The effect of alliance announcements on rivals’ stock
market valuations. Management Sci. 55(8) 1321–1337.
Perry, M. K. 1989. Vertical integration: Determinants and effects.
R. Schmalensee, R. Willig, eds. Handbook of Industrial
Organization, Vol. 1, Chap. 4. North-Holland, Amsterdam,
183–255.
Pfeffer, J., G. R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations:
A Resource Dependence Perspective. Harper and Row, New York.
Rao, H. 2002. Interorganizational ecology. J. A. C. Baum, ed.
Companion to Organizations. Blackwell, London, 541–556.
Rey, P., J. Tirole. 2007. A primer on foreclosure. M. Armstrong,
R. Porter, eds. The Handbook on Industrial Organization III.
North-Holland, New York, 2145–2220.
Ruef, M. 2000. The emergence of organizational forms: A commu-
nity ecology approach. Amer. J. Sociol. 106(3) 658–714.
Salinger, M. A. 1988. Vertical integration and market foreclosure.
Quart. J. Econom. 103(2) 345–356.
de Figueiredo and Silverman: Firm Survival and Industry Evolution in Vertically Related Populations
1650 Management Science 58(9), pp. 1632–1650, © 2012 INFORMS
Salop, S., D. Scheffman. 1983. Raising rivals’ costs. Amer. Econom.
Rev. 73(2) 267–271.
Silverman, B. S., J. A. C. Baum. 2002. Alliance-based competitive
dynamics. Acad. Management J. 45(4) 791–806.
Sine, W. D., H. A. Haveman, P. S. Tolbert. 2005. Risky business?
Entrepreneurship in the new independent power sector. Admin.
Sci. Quart. 50(2) 200–232.
Sorenson, O., D. Waguespack. 2006. Social structure and exchange:
Self-confirming dynamics in Hollywood. Admin. Sci. Quart.
51(4) 560–589.
Williamson, O. E. 1985. Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free
Press, New York.
Williamson, O. E. 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York.
